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Thomas C. Schelling
 
Thomas C. Schelling
Distinguished University Professor, University of Maryland

Schelling, born 1921,  PhD  Harvard economics, 1951, was on the Faculty of Yale University 1953-57, spent 1958-59 at the  RAND Corporation, 1959-90 at Harvard—Department of Economics, Center for International Affairs, and John F. Kennedy School of Government—and 1990-2005 at the University of Maryland’s Department of Economics and School of Public Policy. 

He was a fiscal analyst at the U S Bureau of the Budget, 1945-46, was in the Marshall Plan Mission to Denmark 1948-49, the European Office of the Marshall Plan, Paris, 1949-50, the White House Foreign Policy Staff, 1950-51, and the Executive Office of the President (foreign aid programs), 1951-53.

 

In 2005 he received, jointly with Robert Aumann, the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, “for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis" (The Nobel e-museum)

His main theoretical interests have been bargaining, conflict and cooperation, racial segregation, and techniques of self-management.  His main policy interests have been nuclear weapons, the limitation of war, climate change, foreign aid, and nicotine.

Schelling has been elected to the National Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Medicine, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and is the recipient of the Frank E. Seidman Distinguished Award in Political Economy and the National Academy of Sciences Award for Behavioral Research Relevant to the Prevention of Nuclear War. 

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Link to Nobel Prize autobiography

 
Selected publications
The Strategy of Conflict, (1960).
Experimental Games and Bargaining Theory, World Politics (1960, ).
Arms and Influence, (1966).
Micromotives and Macrobehavior, (1978).
Thinking Through the Energy Problem, (1979).
Incentives for Environmental Protection, (1983).
Choice and Consequence, (1985).
Strategy and Arms Control, (1961).
Bargaining, Communication and Limited War, (1993).
Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays, (2006).