

**DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA, CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS:
POLITICAL PARTY AND PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION
AND WOMEN'S LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION**

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1. INTRODUCTION

Today, the countries of Latin America confront numerous challenges to the quality of their democracies. A 2006 Survey conducted by the Research Department (RES) at the Inter-American Development Bank evaluated challenges faced by Latin America in sixteen thematic areas, one of which was democracy (Berkman and Cavallo, 2006).

Among the sixteen challenge areas, Democracy was considered by the respondents to represent one of the top ten challenges faced by the region. This survey evaluated six principal challenges to democracy in the region. These challenges, are (in order of importance for the survey respondents): "Little real enforcement of rules and accountability for politicians", "Weak democratic culture," "Crisis of representation," "Political intimidation and violence," "Traditional parties losing traditional constituencies," and "No real separation of powers."

The challenges that democracies of Latin America face today are very real, and quite daunting. However, when discussing these challenges, and any solutions to these challenges, we must be cognizant of the considerable diversity in the objective conditions of the democracies of the region. As such, the extent and nature of any specific challenge varies considerably depending on the country in question. Therefore any solution offered to a challenge will vary in many important respects depending on country specific factors (Spiller and Tommasi 2006; Stein and Tommasi 2005). This is not to say that it is not possible to make general recommendations for solutions for the region, but rather that some of the specifics of these recommendations will be different depending on which specific country (or subsets of countries that share common institutional, developmental or other relevant features) one is referring to.

The broad diversity in the current state of democracy in Latin America is illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1 provides the average Freedom Score for the Latin American countries as of January of 2007 (Freedom House, 2007). While the Freedom House scores can be problematic when used for cross-temporal analysis, they are the most valid and reliable measures we have of the quality of democracy in a country at a particular juncture in time.

Figure 1 about here

The Freedom Score (the average of a Political Rights score and a Civil Liberties score) ranges from 1 (most free/democratic) to 7 (least free/undemocratic). Virtually all Western European countries have a Freedom Score of 1 (as do Canada and the United States, among others), while scores of 7 are possessed by the world's most brutal and oppressive dictatorships (e.g., Cuba, North Korea, Sudan). Figure 1 underscores the wide variance in the level of democracy in Latin America, and suggests that the extent and nature of the challenges to democracy in these countries also vary considerably in nature, breadth, and intensity.

Latin America has several countries whose democracies are directly comparable in terms of their political rights and civil liberties to those found in Western Europe. Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay all possess Freedom Scores of 1, and Panama (1.5) is not far behind. A second group of countries have Freedom Scores of 2 and 2.5 (still classified as "Free" by Freedom House), which while indicative of a reasonably well functioning democracy, reveal that compared to the Western European countries, as well as their more democratic counterparts listed above, the functioning of these countries' democracies is deficient in many important respects. The countries that fall in this

category are Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, El Salvador, Guyana, Jamaica, Mexico, and Peru. A third group of countries are located in the Freedom House category of "Partly Free", with Freedom Scores of 3 and 3.5 (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Guatemala). In these countries the level and quality of democracy is markedly inferior to that found in Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Panama. These countries' respective democratic systems also possess more flaws and problems than those of the second group of ten countries listed above. Finally, Haiti and Venezuela's respective democracies suffer from a litany of maladies, such that the continued use of the term "democracy" to describe these two countries stretches the concept of democracy to its very limits (if not beyond them).

The above review of the level and quality of democracy in the countries of Latin America highlights the tremendous diversity of the region's democratic systems. Several countries have democracies that rival the world's best in quality. Other countries however have democracies that suffer from serious deficiencies, with a few sufficiently deficient that the question of whether or not the country can even be considered a democracy is raised.

The challenges faced by Latin America's democracies are numerous. In this paper I draw from the results of the RES survey to examine two serious challenges faced by the region's democracies. The first challenge relates to the weak (and declining) level of institutionalization of the political parties and party systems in the region. Several of the challenges identified in the RES survey are directly linked to the crisis of the region's parties and party systems (i.e., "Little real enforcement of rules and accountability for

politicians," "Crisis of representation," "Traditional parties losing traditional constituencies").

The second challenge relates to the dramatic under representation of women (in particular) and other social groups in the region's national legislatures (i.e., the challenge of "Crisis of representation"). While women are but one of the many social groups underrepresented in the region's legislatures (Van Cott 2007), they are the most important, and therefore for reasons of space here I focus exclusively on issues related to women's under representation. Nonetheless, many of the lessons drawn from the analysis of this challenge and the solutions to this challenge will be applicable in many important respects to other underrepresented social groups (e.g., ethnic and racial minorities, youth, the poor).

2A. POLITICAL PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION: THE PROBLEM AND SOLUTION, BACKGROUND

A crucial characteristic of political party systems is their level of institutionalization. While it is true that there is such a thing as too much institutionalization, which can have a deleterious effect on the functioning of a democracy, with the pre-1993 Venezuelan party system a classic example (Coppedge 1997; Crisp 2000), in general party institutionalization is seen as a positive trait for the functioning of a democracy (Mainwaring 1999, 1998; Mainwaring and Scully 1995).

The more institutionalized a party system is, the greater the likelihood that it will have programmatic political parties.¹ In a party system dominated by programmatic political parties, the parties compete with each other based primarily on policy proposals.

¹ It is however possible to have high levels of party institutionalization along with political parties with a clientelist, non-programmatic, base (Kitschelt 2000).

Furthermore, the policy orientations of the parties tends to be relatively stable, thereby allowing for higher levels of democratic (i.e., voter) accountability and identifiability than occurs in countries with weakly institutionalized party systems (Mainwaring 1999; Shugart and Mainwaring 1997). Institutionalized party systems also provide for greater levels of policy consistency due to the strong role played by parties in political recruitment and the concerted efforts made by political elites to promote (as a unique policy brand) and protect the value of the party label (which implies maintaining relatively consistent policy positions over time, with dramatic changes in policy stances occurring only infrequently).

It is difficult, if not impossible, for a programmatic party to exist within a weakly institutionalized party system. In weakly institutionalized systems, political parties compete based far more on personal appeals or short-term populist policy proposals designed to win over voters and then be forgotten once the election takes place (Mainwaring 1999, 1998). The parties also play a much less prominent role in the political recruitment process. As weakly institutionalized party systems, political parties often are ephemeral in life span, with their policy positions on specific issues highly malleable.

For voters in weakly institutionalized party systems it is much more difficult to hold political parties accountable than in institutionalized party systems. It is also more difficult to identify how one's vote will translate into a governance option, and what that governance option will do once in power (Shugart and Mainwaring 1997). Furthermore, since political parties play a weak role in the recruiting process, are often short-lived, and place less importance on the policy brand name and value of their party label, there is

much less policy consistency in weakly institutionalized party systems than in their institutionalized counterparts. Lastly, given the lack of commitment of political elites to their parties in particular and to the party system in general, weakly institutionalized party systems are much more conducive breeding grounds for anti-system politics than institutionalized party systems.

Scott Mainwaring is widely regarded as the leading authority on party system institutionalization in Latin America (Mainwaring 1999, 1998; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). Mainwaring identifies four key components that together influence the level of party system institutionalization in a country: Stability in Patterns of Inter-party Competition; Party Roots in Society, the Legitimacy of Parties and Elections, and Party Organization. In the following pages I briefly examine each of these components separately, first discussing the conceptual base for the component, then operationalizing this concept as a set of empirical indicators, and finally providing values for these indicators for the democracies of Latin America. The section concludes with the presentation of an index of party institutionalization in 18 Latin American democracies.

Table 1 about here

Stability in Inter-party Patterns of Competition

In institutionalized party systems the relevant parties tend to be the same, year in and out, and to garner relatively similar shares of votes and seats over time. In weakly institutionalized party systems, parties that are relevant in one year often are irrelevant a few years later. Furthermore, the percentage of the vote and seats parties win in these weakly institutionalized systems tend to vary considerably from one election to the next.

The stability of inter-party competition is measured using the following indicator: the level of seat (percentage of the seats) volatility (Seat Volatility) in the most recent lower/single house election (Pedersen 1983).² Latin America presents a wide range of volatility, with countries such as Chile, Honduras, and El Salvador possessing volatility levels comparable to those found in Western Europe (Bartolini and Mair 1990). In these democracies the same parties tend to win comparable vote and seat shares over time. In contrast, the region is home to other countries with extremely high levels of volatility, such as Peru, Guatemala, and Bolivia. Here, parties that were among the most relevant in the country either ceased to exist or saw their popular support plummet over a very short time period. At the same time, parties that either did not exist, or were inconsequential players only a few years earlier, were, a few years later, among the most prominent in the country.

Party Roots in Society

In institutionalized party systems, parties have strong roots in society (Mainwaring 1999, 1998). Voters tend to cast their ballots for the same party election after election, and the parties possess a high level of linkage with society. In weakly institutionalized party systems, parties are only loosely rooted in society. Voters commonly lack loyalty to parties, and instead cast their votes more based on the traits and characteristics of the individual candidates or their electoral campaign messages. In addition, parties possess relatively weak and ephemeral ties with society.

The extent of party roots in society (Party Roots) is measured employing three indicators. The first is the percentage of the population that possessed some form of

² In Table 1 this value is subtracted from 100, so that lower values signify higher volatility. For greater measurement and operationalization details on many of the variables, see Jones (2005).

identification with a party.³ The second is the percentage of legislators who believe that there exists a strong to moderate level of party identification in their country (PELA 2007). The third is calculated by subtracting from 100 the percentage of legislators who believe parties are distant from society in their country (PELA 2007).

In terms of overall party roots in society, one extreme is represented by Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay, all of which have parties with deeply entrenched roots in society. In contrast, party roots in society are quite shallow at the other extreme of this measure, such as in Chile, Guatemala, and Brazil.

The Legitimacy of Political Parties and Elections

A basic prerequisite for an institutionalized party system is that both parties as well as the elections in which they compete are viewed as legitimate by the population (Mainwaring 1999, 1998). Furthermore, for an institutionalized party system to exist, parties must be viewed as institutions that are vital to the functioning of the democratic system. In contrast, in weakly institutionalized party systems both parties as well as elections do not enjoy a high level of legitimacy. Furthermore, a significant proportion of citizens are skeptical of the usefulness of parties as institutions.

Two aspects of political party legitimacy are examined. The first is the percentage of citizens who stated parties were indispensable for the functioning of the country. The second is the percentage of the population that had a great deal or some confidence in parties. The average of these two is the Party Legitimacy measure.

Election legitimacy is assessed using two measures. The first asked respondents to rate elections in their country on a scale of clean) to not clean. The second asked respondents the extent to which they agreed with the statement that elections offer voters

³ All public opinion data come from the Latinobarómetro survey (2000-2005).

a real choice between parties and candidates on a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to four (strongly disagree). In each case the average score (1 to 5, and 1 to 4, respectively) for all valid responses is calculated. This result is then divided by the high score for the scale (5 and 4 respectively). Finally, this resulting percentage is subtracted from 100 to produce the two measures.

P&E Legitimacy is an aggregate measure of Political Party and Election Legitimacy. One extreme on this aggregate measure is represented by Uruguay, Venezuela, and Chile, where both political parties and elections enjoy considerable legitimacy among the population. At the other extreme, represented by Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador, both elections and political parties suffer from a serious crisis of legitimacy.

Political Party Organization

In institutionalized party systems, the parties possess a noteworthy level of material and human resources, intra-party processes are predictable and routinized, and the party as an institution is prescient over individual party leaders (Mainwaring 1998). In weakly institutionalized party systems, parties have limited resources, internal processes are unpredictable, and individual leaders dominate the parties, with the party as an institution weak to nonexistent.

Party organization is measured using two variables: political party age (Mainwaring 1999, 1998) and elite opinion that their party is a continuously functioning organization, and not primarily an electoral vehicle. The party age variable is itself the average of two variables. The first is the percentage of parties (those that held at least 10% of the seats in the lower/single house) that as of 2004 had been in existence for at least 10 years. The second is the percentage of the same parties that as of 2004 had been

in existence for at least 25 years. The second measure of party organization is based on a PELA (2007) question that asked legislators if they considered their party organization to be continuous or if they thought the party organization was merely and electoral vehicle.

Party organization is the strongest in El Salvador, Uruguay, and Argentina. It is the weakest in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Colombia.

Party Institutionalization Index

In Table 1 the four aggregate measures discussed above are presented, and then aggregated , to create a Party Institutionalization Index. According to this index, countries such as Uruguay, El Salvador, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Chile possess well institutionalized party systems, while countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Guatemala, and Bolivia possess weakly institutionalized party systems. Intermediate cases are Argentina, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Brazil.

There is a very strong relationship between the level of party institutionalization and crucial factors such as the quality of a country's democratic system and the level of corruption in a country. For instance, the institutionalized party systems possess an average Freedom House Freedom Score of 1.8, notably better than that possessed by either the intermediate (2.3) and weakly institutionalized (3.2) party systems. By the same token the institutionalized party systems are noticeably less corrupt than their weakly institutionalized counterparts. According to the World Bank's Control of Corruption indicator (with lower scores indicating higher levels of corruption), the institutionalized, intermediate, and weakly institutionalized party systems have average scores of 54.1, 39.8, and 32.0 respectively (Kaufmann et al. 2007).

2B. POLITICAL PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION: THE SOLUTION

The previous concise overview of political party and party system institutionalization reveals the great diversity that exists within the Latin American democracies. The first set of more institutionalized party systems tends to have the basic building blocks necessary for a well institutionalized party system comparable to those found in the exemplary democracies of Western Europe. While these party systems have some modest problems, it is clear that there exists a solid foundation upon which to still construct a solid institutionalized party system. At the other extreme, the current state of the political party system is sufficiently dilapidated that it is unclear if current conditions are auspicious for any serious efforts to construct a more institutionalized party system. In these countries it is possible that the political party system is sufficiently degraded such that any efforts to improve the level of political party and party system institutionalization may meet with only limited success. The intermediate party systems occupy a mid-point between these two extremes, with the setting conducive to the establishment of a more institutionalized party system, but with the amount of effort (and level of uncertainty surrounding the possibility of success) greater than in the more institutionalized party systems.

The general solution proposed for the crisis of Latin America's political parties and party systems is to increase the level of political party and party system institutionalization. A set of reforms are proposed whose purpose would be to increase the level of party and party system institutionalization in Latin America. The goal of these reforms focuses principally on increasing the value of the party label, bolstering the incentives for politicians to engage in activities designed to enhance the stability,

reputation and functioning of political parties, and improving the legitimacy of political parties and elections.

The Political Party Marketplace

The institutionalization of political parties in many Latin American countries is undermined by the widespread defection of existing legislators and politicians, the constant formation and extinction of different political parties, the failure of legislators to follow party directives within legislative bodies, and a general lack of concern exhibited by politicians for their party's reputation in the eyes of the public. These deficiencies are in many countries the consequence of the low barriers to entry for new political parties and low thresholds for political party survival. Below is a series of proposals designed to enhance the level of political party and party system institutionalization in Latin America (the focus here is on political parties competing in national level elections).

A first reform is to establish a relatively high barrier to entry for new political parties. The goal of this reform is to make the formation of a new political party a non-trivial matter, thereby providing incentives for politicians to remain within their existing party as well as to follow party mandates and directives. At the same time, it is desirable that these barriers to entry not be prohibitively high. Mexico provides a good example that both protects against the proliferation of parties but at the same time allows for reasonable entry for new political parties that demonstrate an important level of popular support. The basic components of its law requires the party to have a small number of registered members (3000) in two-thirds (20 of 32) of Mexico's states, a smaller number of members in two-thirds (200 of 300) of the Mexico's single-member districts, and a total number of members that equals 0.26% of the number of registered voters in the

country. In addition to these requisites, a requirement (such as in Honduras) that the party possess a functioning organization in at least one half of all departments and in at least one half of all municipalities provides an important additional barrier to entry.

The proposed reform that should be adopted by all countries (except in the event that the existing barriers to entry in that area are greater) are the following. To achieve formal registration as a political party a party must have a number of members equal to 1% of the registered voters in two-thirds of the country's largest sub-national territorial units (i.e., states, provinces, departments, regions) as well as have a number of members equal to 1% of the registered voters in the country as a whole. The party must also possess a functioning organization in at least two-thirds of the largest sub-national territorial unit and in at least one-half of the country's municipalities (municipalities with populations above a certain threshold that will likely vary by country, such as 5000 inhabitants).

The second proposed reform relates to the extinction of political parties. In order to promote an institutionalized political party system, weak political parties must be culled from the herd of existing parties, and not allowed to remain around to serve as "parties of convenience" and/or crowd the ballot. This is accomplished through a reform that establishes a minimum percentage of the vote that parties must win in each legislative election (lower or single house). El Salvador and Nicaragua's rules are instructive in this case. They require that parties receive in at least 3% (El Salvador) and 4% (Nicaragua) of the valid vote at the national level to maintain their official registration as a party (in El Salvador for coalitions this number is multiplied by the number of parties in the coalition). Nicaragua (similar to other countries, such as

Mexico) also requires parties to run candidates for a minimum percentage of public offices. The proposed reform here would follow these models and require that a party be disbanded if it fails to win at least 4% of the valid vote at the national level (multiplied by the number of coalition partners for coalitions, up to a maximum of 12%) in the election for members of the lower/single house. It would also require the parties to run candidates for at least one-half of the positions being contested in all national legislative elections.

The third reform relates to the formation of alliances in national elections. Following the general model of Brazil for presidential elections, all electoral alliances among parties must be national in scope, in that alliance partners in one legislative district must be the same as in all other legislative districts and at the national level (i.e., for presidential elections). All decisions regarding the formation of alliances would be made by the political party's national leadership.

Party and Campaign Finance

The next set of reforms is designed to influence the system of campaign and party finance in the country. Following the lead of many European countries (e.g., Germany) the state should provide the political parties with very generous resources designed to promote education, mobilization, and recruitment efforts by the parties between elections, in order to deepen the ties political parties have with the country's electorate. The amount of this financing will vary by country, but it should be of sufficient size (e.g., 0.5% to 0.25% of the country's annual national budget depending on the overall size of the budget) that it will allow the parties to engage in considerable outreach activities and at the same time enhance the incentives for politicians to remain within their party and work to bolster its national reputation. In order to bolster a reduced set of the most

relevant and viable parties, these funds should be limited to parties with a minimum percentage of seats in the lower/single house (e.g., 5%).

The next reform is comparable in intent, in that it would provide ample campaign financing to parties that receive a minimum percentage of the vote in national elections. Parties that surpassed a minimum percentage of the vote (such as 5% as in France) would be reimbursed for campaign expenses up to a set amount (an amount sufficiently high that it represents a significant proportion of a party's overall expenditures).

A final reform in this vein would have the national government allocate copious amounts of time on national television and radio to political parties in proportion to the number of legislative seats occupied by the party members (e.g., following the general concepts of the Brazilian model). A related reform would restrict television and radio advertisements to those allocated by the national government.

Candidate Selection

A problem faced by many political parties is insuring that elected representatives support general party positions in their elected office. The responsiveness of these elected officials can be enhanced by two reforms. The first provides the party leadership with control over the candidate nomination process and access to the ballot using the party label. In order to promote intra-party democracy while still maintaining a prominent role for the party leadership, a mixed-selectorate multi-stage selection process such as that advocated by Rahat (2007) would be utilized. A second, more drastic reform (and perhaps one that would be best not to implement in some countries), would follow the example of Mexico and prohibit immediate re-election to national offices (thereby

placing the fate of elected public officials in the hands of the party leadership to a considerable extent).

Voting Reforms

A final set of reforms relates to increasing the linkages among candidates for public office, and thereby increasing the extent of "party" oriented voting. First, in those countries where the presidential and legislative elections are not held concurrently, the constitution should be reformed so that the presidential and legislative elections are held on the same day. This is especially the case for those countries that do not have a mixed timing cycle (e.g., one half of the presidential and legislative contests held concurrently and one half held nonconcurrently), such as Colombia, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela. In these countries all or virtually all legislative elections are held separately from the presidential contest. The situation in the mixed systems that hold one-half of the lower house elections (Mexico), and lower and upper house elections (Argentina) would also be improved by reforming the constitution to allow for concurrent elections.⁴ These concurrent elections would enhance the national nature of the electoral process and enhance the extent of a "party oriented" vote.

The second reform in this area relates to the ballot structure. The logic behind this reform is to link the different votes for different offices together such that the voter casts a vote more based on party than individual candidate characteristics. The most extreme form of vote linkage (and one that is not advocated here) is the use of a fused vote where voters are provided with only one vote for multiple offices. For instance, Bolivian voters have but one vote with which to select candidates for three offices

⁴ Given the six year presidential terms in Mexico, in the event of this type of reform it would be wise to consider a reduction in the length of the presidential term to four or five years (as are in force throughout the rest of the region).

(President, Senator, Chamber of Deputies-Party List), as do Uruguayans (President, Senator, Chamber of Deputies). A middle option is to embrace the model of many U.S. states and allow voters the option of casting a straight party ticket vote. This middle option is similar to the option Argentine voters have of placing an unaltered party-supplied ballot (as opposed to an Australian ballot) for all offices in their ballot envelope that they then cast on election day.

Together the package of reforms detailed above would improve the level of party institutionalization in the Latin American democracies. Several benefits would be obtained from this increased level of political party and party system institutionalization. As political party and party system institutionalization increase, politics will be more programmatic, with political parties competing to a much greater extent based on public policy proposals than on short-term populist promises, clientelism, and personalist appeals.

2C. POLITICAL PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION: SUMMARY OF BENEFITS AND COSTS

Overall, and *ceteris paribus*, democracies with more institutionalized party systems should have more programmatic politics and less personalist and clientelist based politics. These reforms should thus increase the extent of programmatic politics in these countries, providing incentives for political parties and politicians to compete based more on their party's programmatic platform than on personalist or populist appeals.

This increased focus by the political parties and politicians on programmatic politics should also provide for greater public policy consistency, as parties and

politicians will be evaluated by the electorate based on the extent to which they successfully implement their proposed/promised public policy agenda.

Irrespective of the increase in programmatic politics, by inducing a greater level of political party and party system institutionalization will provide a significantly greater level of accountability and of identifiability. In contrast to the present situation in a majority of Latin American countries, citizens will be better able to hold an executive (through their party) accountable for the performance in office. The presence of institutionalized parties should also increase the linkage between citizens and politicians, thereby providing for greater support for and confidence in the functioning of the democratic system.

The potential costs of these reforms are three-fold. From a monetary perspective the increased financial support will represent a modest drain on the national budget (in an amount that will vary considerably depending on the current level of state support for political parties in the different countries and the economies of scale present in the different countries). There is also a danger that by supporting existing political parties and creating somewhat high barriers to entry, that the political party system may ossify and become unrepresentative and detached from the electorate. The case of Venezuela is instructive in this respect (see Coppedge 1997 and Crisp 2000).

Finally, it is possible that the increased resources provided to the political parties will not in the fostering of programmatic parties, but rather the consolidation of clientelist politics and powerful parties (see Kitschelt 2000). This is especially likely to be the case in the more corrupt countries of Latin America, where it is quite possible that the increasing power of parties will result more in the consolidation of clientelist machines

than in the generation of policy oriented parties. Figure 2 for instance, using data collected by the World Bank, provides the global percentile ranking of these countries in terms of the extent to which corruption is controlled in the country (Kaufmann et al. 2007). A higher ranking means the country is less corrupt and a lower ranking means it is more corrupt. The high levels of corruption present in Latin America, make it quite possible that any attempts to increase the power of parties will have the undesired effect of increasing the power of clientelist machines, with the greater the level of corruption in a country, the greater the potential "cost" associated with the empowering of clientelist politics. Thus we would expect these reforms designed to enhance party institutionalization to have the least risk of resulting in an entrenchment of clientelist machines in countries like Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, El Salvador, Colombia, and Panama, and the most risk of resulting in an entrenchment of clientelist politics in Venezuela, Paraguay, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Guatemala.

Figure 2 about here

The benefits of the above mentioned four categories of reforms were determined based on the extent to which an adoption of the reforms would improve the level of party institutionalization compared to that which is existent under the present rules (Payne et al. 2007). The costs were based on the monetary cost associated with the reform compared to existing expenditures in the area, the potential that the reforms may block out legitimate political competitors and promote party system ossification, and the probability that the reforms will work to strengthen clientelist machines in a country (Payne et al. 2007). The costs and benefits for each category were evaluated on a three point scale, ranging from 0 (low benefit/low cost) to 2 (high benefit/high cost), with the

values then summed for a cost and benefit score that respectively can range from 0 (no benefit, no cost) to 8/6 (very high benefit, very high cost). These benefit and cost values as well as the benefit cost ratio are provided in Table 2.

Table 2 about here

The values in Table 2 have no absolute meaning. They do however assist in evaluating across countries the relative benefits of the proposed reforms compared to the relative costs of these reforms. In some instances reforms are likely to have a high benefit to cost ratio (e.g., Colombia, Uruguay), while in others the costs appear to be noticeably greater than the benefits (e.g., Bolivia, Nicaragua).

3A. WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION: THE PROBLEM AND SOLUTION, BACKGROUND

The 1995 United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing highlighted the dramatic under representation of women in decision making bodies and advocated a series of policies that governments should adopt to rectify this under representation. The under representation of women in legislatures is criticized as problematic for two principal reasons. First, inadequate descriptive representation of women represents a serious flaw in the functioning of a democracy (e.g., Darcy et al. 1994; Inter-Parliamentary Union 1994; Phillips 1995). Second, numerous studies demonstrate there are several significant differences between male and female legislators in legislative behavior and policy preferences (e.g., Bratton and Ray 2002; Karam 1998; Thomas 1994).

One of the most prominent recommendations to emerge from the Beijing Conference was that governments should adopt positive action policies to increase the

number of women holding public office (United Nations 1995). Figure 2 details the level of women's representation in Latin America's national legislatures. The dramatic and embarrassing under representation of women in Latin America's legislative bodies is clearly evident a dozen years after the Beijing conference, and has been recognized a serious democratic deficit faced by the region by a host of scholars and policymakers, with the gap between current reality and the goal of parity a principal focus of the recent (August 2007) Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) X Session of the Regional Conference on Women in Latin America and the Caribbean (Montaño 2007). Of the 29 legislative bodies in the figure, only one has a composition that is at least 40% female (Argentine Senate) while only three have a composition that is at least 30% female (Argentine Senate, Costa Rican Unicameral Assembly, Argentine Chamber). In contrast, in nine of the legislative bodies women represent 10% or less of the members, and a further eleven legislatures have a membership that is between 11% and 20% female.

Figure 3 about here

Nowhere in the world has the Beijing Conferences recommendation been followed more than in Latin America, where between 1996 and 2000 eleven countries adopted legislation requiring minimum percentages of women on the party lists used for the election of national legislators. In spite of the adoption of this legislation, the percentage of women legislators in many of these countries remains very low, with only a handful of cases that can be considered unqualified successes. In order to address the current dismal representation of women in Latin America's legislatures a series of

reforms must be adopted, reforms that depend in part on a country's existing electoral legislation.

In Figure 3 the percentage bars for the legislative bodies are one of three colors. Green indicates the country employs well-designed gender quota legislation to elect members of that legislative body. Yellow indicates that the country employs well-designed gender quota legislation to select a portion of that legislative body. Red indicates the country employs no quota rules or has flawed quota rules governing the election of members of the legislature.

Htun and Jones (2002) underscore the combined importance of the use of closed lists, placement mandates, moderate to large sized electoral districts (which on average will generate moderate to large sized party magnitudes), and strict compliance rules in insuring the effectiveness of quota legislation. They in particular note that quota legislation will, *ceteris paribus*, result in a larger percentage of women elected when it is used in concert with closed lists and placement mandates than when the same quota legislation is used in conjunction with open lists (where placement mandates are not effective).

The type of party list (closed or open) is highly consequential for the effectiveness of a quota law. A prominent advantage of closed list systems when used in concert with gender quotas and placement mandates) is that when combined with adequate enforcement of compliance, they guarantee a minimum floor of women's representation across all parties/districts. For example, in Argentina, Costa Rica, and Mexico (where a closed list, placement mandates, and strict compliance are in force), we can be assured, at the minimum, that if a party wins three seats in a district, at least one of the seats will be

occupied by a women (Jones, 2004).⁵ In some districts more than one woman will occupy the party's garnered seats, but at the minimum one always will. In contrast to closed list systems, open list systems provide no such guarantee. Thus while in some districts women will do quite well electorally (as is also the case in closed list systems), in others they do quite poorly, even when their party wins a substantial number of seats. In sum, the potential distribution of women elected under closed list systems (once party magnitude reaches two in an overwhelming number of cases in Argentina and Costa Rica, and when it reaches three in all other cases in these two countries as well as in Bolivia [with a few exceptions due to compliance failure] and Mexico) is truncated at a low of between 20% and 50% depending on party magnitude and country-specific rules. In contrast the distribution of women elected under open list systems is never truncated (i.e., its low value is always 0%). Based on this logic, most scholars (e.g., Baldez, 2004; Htun and Jones 2002; Krook, 2005; Norris, 2001) posit that, *ceteris paribus*, the combined use of quotas with placement mandates and closed party lists should result in a greater number of women elected to Congress than is the case when quotas without placement mandates are utilized in concert with open party lists. Recently however, a few scholars (Matland 2006; Schmidt 2005) have questioned the above logic, concluding that the two arrangements are equally effective in terms of the election of women legislators.

In the absence of gender quota legislation, the effect of the use of a closed vs. open list will depend in large part on whether the party elites who largely decide the composition of the party lists are more or less favorable to the election of women than the

⁵ Recent compliance in Bolivia (2005), while very high, was not absolute by all political parties in all electoral districts.

electorate (Rule and Shugart 1995; Matland 2005; Matland 2006). If the elites are more progressive than the electorate then women are more likely to be elected under the closed list arrangement, while the obverse would be the case if the electorate was more progressive than the elites.

In all of the above cases, the greater the number of seats that a party wins (that is the larger party magnitude), the greater the number of women who are likely to be elected (Matland 2005). Whether this relationship is linear, logarithmic, or follows some other distribution is a question for which the extant literature provides little guidance.

3B. WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION: RESEARCHING A SOLUTION

Given the lack of consensus in the scholarly literature regarding the relationship between electoral rules and the election of women, it was necessary to conduct an original analysis of the manner in which electoral laws affect the election of women legislators. To conduct the analysis for this project I gathered district-level election data for the most recent legislative elections in the Latin American democracies. Given the relatively limited temporal experience with quotas in the region, the number of available time points per country is very limited, and is sufficiently limited that any gains in terms of population size are substantially offset by the problems generated by the need to control for time series nature of the data. In all, the most recent democratic elections (two or three in the case of partial renewal systems) are examined: Argentina (2001, 2003, 2005), Bolivia (2005), Brazil (2002, 2006), Chile (2001, 2005), Colombia (2006), Costa Rica (2006), the Dominican Republic (2006), Ecuador (2006), El Salvador (2006), Guatemala (2003), Honduras (2005), Mexico (2006), Nicaragua (2006), Panama (2004),

Paraguay (2003), Peru (2006), Puerto Rico (2004), Uruguay (2005), and Venezuela (2000). For basic information on the electoral systems in these countries, see Table 3.

Table 3 about here

These legislative bodies vary in terms of whether or not they utilize a closed or open list for these electoral contests. Closed lists predominate in Latin America. Finally, Colombia allows political parties to the list format they employ, although in practice almost all relevant parties in Colombia use open lists. Among the open list systems, there is some variance in terms of the number of votes an individual may utilize, ranging from one to as many as there are seats being cast.

Of the twenty-one countries, nine possess some form of national quota legislation for at least one of their legislative houses: Argentina (Chamber, Senate), Bolivia (Chamber, Senate), Brazil (Chamber), Costa Rica (Unicameral), the Dominican Republic (Chamber), Ecuador (Unicameral), Honduras (Unicameral), Mexico (Chamber and Senate), Panama (Unicameral), Paraguay (Chamber and Senate), and Peru (Unicameral). These quota systems can be divided into three general categories: those where a minimum percentage of women must appear on the list and placement mandates are in force, those where a minimum percentage of women must appear on the list but where placement mandates are not in force (in all cases because placement mandates are incompatible with the open list format), and those where no minimum percentage of women must appear on the list and where placement mandates are not in force. The minimum percentages set by the quotas in the first two groups of systems range from 30% to 45%, with 30% being the most common percentage.

The first group of systems consists of the Argentine Chamber and Senate, the Bolivian Chamber (PR seats only), the Costa Rican Legislative Assembly, and the Mexican Chamber of Deputies (PR seats only) and Senate (PR list seats only). In Argentina and Costa Rica the placement mandates are based on the past electoral success of the political party in the district. In practice, one of the first two candidates must be a woman at the minimum, except in large magnitude districts where the party has historically won a number of seats of three or more (in which case the minimum list position for a woman is third). Subsequent seats on the list must be allocated using a similar logic such that the percentage of electable list positions held by women candidates corresponds to the quota percentage. The Bolivian Chamber and Mexican Chamber and Senate (PR seats only) systems are less complex, requiring that at the minimum every third person on the party list be a woman.

In the second group of systems, minimum quota percentages exist, but as these are all open list systems, it is not possible to implement placement mandates, and thus these devices are not in force in these systems. Included in this category are the unicameral houses in Ecuador, Honduras, and Peru as well as the Chamber in the Dominican Republic. The final group of systems are those where quota legislation exists, but where this quota legislation does not require a minimum percentage of women to appear on the party lists, allows the political parties with considerable loopholes by which to undermine the effectiveness of the law, or applies only to party primary elections (and only loosely there). For the purposes of this analysis, these are considered "flawed" quota systems, and are analyzed as a group in the same category as those systems that do not have quota legislation. They are the Bolivian Senate, Brazilian Chamber, Mexican

Chamber (single-member districts), Mexican Senate (state-level districts), Panamanian Chamber, and the Paraguayan Chamber and Senate.

Compliance with this legislation has been generally good throughout the region, although as is the case with most laws in the region, some non-compliance has occurred on occasion and the interpretation of the laws sometimes disputed (with organizations promoting the election of women often advocating an expansive view of the legislation that is at times not shared by all actors in the country). The discussion above of the third group of quota systems highlighted several loopholes and gray areas present in those countries' respective quota legislation

In addition to the national quota laws, many political parties have modified their charters to add party-level quotas. These quota rules specify a minimum percentage of candidates that should be women, but lack placement mandates as well as are normally vague as to the actual implementation and enforcement of the quotas. While these party-level quotas are all essentially equal or inferior to those contained in the country's national quota legislation in the quota systems, many political parties in non-quota systems do employ them and based on the Western European experience (Caul 2001; Caul Kittilson) they may be influential. Analysis (not presented) indicates that there is no significant linkage between the presence of party quotas and the election of women that is not accounted for (in a superior manner) by a party's ideological orientation (left vs. non-left).

The key unit analysis for any study of the effectiveness of gender quotas is the district-level party list, since that is the arena at which specific candidates are elected to public office and at which the quota legislation operates most prominently. In this study,

the analysis population consists of all district-level party/coalition lists that won one or more seats in the district. Together these 19 countries provide 2017 distinct district level party/coalition lists, and 1435 distinct district level party/coalition lists in which one or more seats were garnered and where district magnitude was greater than 1.⁶

The dependent variable for this analysis is the percentage of women elected by the party/coalition in a district. An alternative variable, the number of women elected, was also utilized, and provides (using a variety of econometric techniques such as negative binomial regression, Poisson regression, ordered probit regression, ordered logit regression, and ordinary least squares regression analysis) results that support the general conclusions made using the percentage of women elected.

The independent variables fall into three groups. The first is a set of binary variables that account for the four possible electoral system combinations: closed list and gender quota with placement mandates, open list and gender quota, closed list and no gender quota or a flawed gender quota, and open list and no gender quota or a flawed gender quota.⁷

The second set of variables measures the size of party magnitude. Given the lack of any theory specifying the relationship between party magnitude and the election of women, I follow the model of Beck, Tucker, and Katz (1997) and create splines for the

⁶ As preliminary analysis demonstrated that the single-member districts did not differ significantly in terms of the election of women from instances where a party won a single seat in a multi-member district, the analysis was restricted to multi-member districts as the large number of zero values (for the election of women) represented an obstacle to reliable econometric analysis.

⁷ Quota percentages range from 30% to 45%, with a median of 30%. Due to their interaction with party magnitude (creating different effective quotas) along with the limited variance in most systems, there is no relationship between quota size and the election of women. Preliminary analysis uncovered no relevant differences between the systems with flawed quota legislation and those with no quota legislation, and thus for the analysis here these two categories are merged for the two list formats.

different party magnitude categories (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 to 10, 11 to 15, and 16 to 22). The final independent variable is party magnitude, that is the number of seats won by the party/coalition in the district.

Control variables for the ideology of the political party, left wing or not (Caul 2001) and popular attitudes towards the election of women (Matland 2006) are also included but not discussed.

Table 4 provides the results of an analysis of the complete population. All three of the electoral system variables are significant at the .01 level or above, with the negative estimated coefficients indicating that all three electoral system's use results in, ceteris paribus, a significantly lower percentage of women elected than does the use of the baseline electoral system (Closed List-Quotas).

Table 4 about here

In order to better compare the four electoral systems, the expected values (and 95% confidence intervals) for the four variables are obtained using Clarify (King et al. 2000), with all non-electoral system variables set to their mean values, and presented in Table 4. The highest expected value (percentage of women elected by a party in an electoral district) is found for the Closed List-Quotas systems, with an expected value of 30% (ranging from 28% to 32%), followed by the Open List-Quotas systems, with an expected value of 22% (19% to 25%), the Open List-Flawed/No Quotas systems with an expected value of 13% (10% to 15%), and the Closed List-Flawed/No Quotas systems with an expected value of 10% (8% to 11%). Based on these results it is possible to make three principal conclusions regarding the relationship between the election of women and electoral systems. First, among the quota systems, the Closed List-Quotas

result in a significantly greater percentage of women elected than do the Open List-Quotas systems, with an average percentage of women expected to be elected in the former systems that is 8% greater than that found in the latter systems. Second, both effective quota systems (Closed List-Quotas, Open List-Quotas) result in a percentage of women elected that is significantly greater than that found in the systems that have either no quota legislation or flawed quota legislation (Closed List-Flawed/No Quotas, Open List-Flawed/No Quotas). The gap is especially large for the Closed List-Quotas systems, which on average result in a percentage of women elected that is 20% (Closed List-Flawed/No Quotas) and 17% (Open List-Flawed/No Quotas) greater than in the non/flawed quota systems. The comparable values for the Open List-Quota systems are 12% and 9%. Finally, there is not a significant difference in the percentage of women expected to be elected in the closed list and open list systems when either no quota legislation or flawed quota legislation is in force.

In terms of practical policy lessons, the most important lesson is that the adoption of effective quota legislation will on average result in a significant boost in the percentage of women elected to a country's national legislature, regardless of whether or not a closed or open list is utilized for the election. The second important lesson is that this quota legislation is likely to result in a higher percentage of women elected in systems where closed lists are utilized than in systems where open lists are employed. The final lesson is that when effective quota legislation is not in force, it makes little difference for the election of women whether or not a closed list or open list is used to elect national legislators.

No significant relationship was found between the size of party magnitude and the percentage of women elected. For instance, as party magnitude rises in values, the percentage of women elected by a party in a district does not increase (if anything it drops slightly especially at the higher party magnitude values), albeit not in a significant manner.

To better understand the relationship between electoral laws, quota legislation, and the election of women, this section deepens the previous analysis in two directions. First, the study population is split into five sub-sections based on party magnitude value and analyzed separately. Second, the study population is split into four sub-sections based on the electoral system/quota legislation combination.

Table 5 contains analysis that divides the analysis population into five groups based on party magnitude value 1 (Model 2), 2, (Model 3), 3 (Model 4), 4 (Model 5), 5 to 22 (Model 6).⁸ As party magnitude is held constant (except in Model 6 where the party magnitude variables are included in the analysis, but not reported in the table for reasons of space), no party magnitude splines are included.

Table 5 about here

The results in Table 5 allow us to provide a more nuanced interpretation of the relationship between electoral system and quota legislation and the election of women than was possible in the previous analysis of the entire analysis population. First, the superiority of the quota systems to systems with either no or flawed quota legislation varies depending on party magnitude. When party magnitude is 1, the Closed List-Quotas systems are equivalent in terms of the election of women to both non/flawed

⁸ The party magnitude values ranging from five to 22 are examined jointly due to the small numbers of cases with higher party magnitude values of five and higher.

quota systems. At the same time the Open List-Quota systems result in an expected percentage of women elected by a party at the district level that is significantly greater than the closed list systems without or with flawed quota legislation, but that is not significantly greater than that found in the open list systems without or with flawed quota legislation. Thus within the context of the use of open lists, a system where party magnitude is often 1, would be unlikely to receive much in the way of an increase in the percentage of women elected were it to adopt effective quota legislation. In all other cases (except where Party Magnitude is 4, and where the small number of cases results in imprecise expected values), both quota systems significantly outperform the non-quota/flawed quota systems in terms of the election of women.⁹ Even when party magnitude is four, the Closed List-Quotas systems result in a significantly greater expected percentage of women elected than both non/flawed quota systems and the Open List-Quotas systems significantly outperform the Open List-Flawed/No Quotas systems, with the overlapping confidence intervals between Open List-Quotas and Closed List-Flawed/No Quotas primarily the consequence of the limited number of cases in this category.

Second, the superiority of the closed list quota systems to the open list quota systems is restricted primarily to instances where party magnitude is 2 (Model 3) and to a much lesser extent 3 (Model 4). For the other party magnitude values (1, 4, and 5 to 22) there exists no meaningful difference between the percentage of women expected to be elected in the Closed List-Quotas and Open List-Quotas system. In sum, the significant

⁹ For Model 4, given the relatively small number of cases and the extremely marginal overlap between the lower bound for Open List-Quotas and the higher bound for Open List-Flawed/No Quotas, the difference between these two values is considered here to be significant (i.e., if more cases were added we would expect this overlap to vanish).

difference between the percentage of women elected in these two systems detailed in Table 4 is the product almost exclusively of the massive gap between the two systems' performance when party magnitude two, where the expected value for the Closed List-Quotas system is 48%, 30% greater than the expected value for the Open List-Quotas systems.

Table 6 provides a distinct sub-group analysis, that divides the analysis population into four groups based on the type of list and quota legislation in force (i.e., the four influential electoral system/quota variables examined previously: Closed List-Quotas (Model 7), Open List-Quotas (Model 8), Closed List-Flawed/No Quotas (Model 9), Open List-Flawed/No Quotas (Model 10).

Table 6 about here

Three principal conclusions are drawn from the analysis in Table 5. First, there exists no noteworthy relationship between party magnitude and the percentage of women elected in either of the open list systems (Models 8 and 10). Second, in the closed list systems without or with flawed quota legislation, there is only a weak, and somewhat inconsistent positive relationship between party magnitude and the percentage of women elected.

Third, for all intents and purposes, the only strong relationship between party magnitude and the percentage of women elected exists among the closed list systems with well designed quota legislation.¹⁰ This relationship is however somewhat curvilinear in format, with a strong and significant difference between Party Magnitude-2 and all other party magnitude values, with the sharpest differences found at the two

¹⁰ The limited number of cases for party magnitude values of 4 and greater requires that we treat the findings for these categories with some caution.

extremes between it and Party Magnitude-1 (33%) at one end and Party Magnitude 6 to 22 (19%) at the other, with no significant differences within the group of Party Magnitude-3, Party Magnitude-4, Party Magnitude-5, Party Magnitude-6 to 22. However, for all of these variables (with the partial potential exception of Party Magnitude-5 due to the small number of cases in that category, and hence very large confidence intervals), the percentage of women expected to be elected is significantly greater than is the case when a party elects only one legislator in the district (i.e., Party Magnitude-1 equals 1).

3B. WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION: THE SOLUTION

The review above highlights three principal areas in which reforms should be adopted in Latin American to improve the representation of women in the region's national legislatures: Quota Legislation, List Format, and Party Magnitude.

The most fundamental of the reforms is that countries should adopt the most effective gender quota legislation for the election of the members of their national legislature. If a country wants to significantly increase its percentage of women legislators in the short (or even medium) term, the best option is the adoption of quota legislation.

All countries should be required to adopt quota legislation that provides for the following. No more than half of the legislative candidates for the party in each district can be of the same sex (where the number of candidates is odd, the odd candidate can be of either sex). In the closed list systems the candidate lists must be zippered. The first candidate can be of either sex, but all subsequent candidates must alternate by sex. In the open list systems, a similar 50% quota should be adopted (pending future analysis that

demonstrates that an increase in the number of women candidates above a certain threshold, such as 30%, does not diminish the percentage of women elected). This legislation must also have rigid compliance standards that are reviewed and enforced by the governmental electoral authorities/courts. Parties that do not comply with the legislation in a district will not be able to run candidates in that district.

For the closed list systems with quotas, the above reform would have a modest, but important, impact on women's representation via the increase in the quota percentage (from the present 30%, 33%, or 40% to 50%), through a more effective placement mandate (i.e., zippering), and through the assurance of 100% compliance. For instance, in the Argentine Chamber (30% quota, placement mandate), had this reform been in force in the previous election cycle, the percentage of women elected (*ceteris paribus*) would have been 44% (significantly higher than the actual value of 35%).

At present it is not possible to predict with any accuracy the impact of an increase in the quota percentages in the open list systems. However, if these countries were to replace their open lists with closed lists, we would expect, *ceteris paribus*, an increase in the percentage of women elected of around 10%.

For the countries that currently have either flawed quota legislation or no quota legislation, the adoption of quota legislation (with quota percentages comparable to those existing in the quota systems) would result, *ceteris paribus*, in an increase in the percentage of women elected of approximately 20% (if the closed lists and quota option was utilized) and an increase in the percentage of women elected of around 17% (if the open lists and quota option was utilized).

In those countries that possess or adopt effective quota legislation, closed lists should be adopted where open lists are currently employed. This is particularly the case for those countries that have recently (in the past 10 years) switched from the use of closed lists to open lists (i.e., Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras), for whose political systems that switch back to a closed list should not be overly traumatic.

Finally, Figure 4 highlights a current deficiency of the Latin American electoral systems: 38% (all districts) and 26% (non-SMD districts) of Latin American legislators are the only legislator from their party elected in a district. As noted earlier, women have the most difficulty reaching office when their party only wins one seat in the electoral district in the preferred electoral system for the election of women (closed lists and quotas). Therefore reforms need to be adopted to increase the average size of party magnitude in the event that closed lists and quotas are employed (in the other systems party magnitude is of little relevance for the election of women, and thus any electoral reforms in this realm are unlikely to have a positive effect on the election of women).

Figure 4 about here

In closed list systems with quotas, when party magnitude is one, the expected percentage of women elected is a mere 15%. However, when party magnitude is two, the expected value skyrockets to 48%, before dropping off to 36% (party magnitude of 3), 34% (4), 33% (5), and 28% (6 to 22).

A concrete example of the differential impact of party magnitude on the election of women in the context of quotas and closed lists can be seen in Bolivia where approximately half of the legislators are elected from single-member plurality districts (where no quota law is in force) and the other half from multi-member PR districts

(where a 30% quota with placement mandates is in force). In Bolivia, only 7% of the legislators elected from the single-member districts in 2005 were women, compared to 31% in the multi-member districts. Another recent example comes from the Argentine province of Córdoba where in the 2007 provincial election, 19 of the 40 legislators elected from the province-wide district using PR (with a 50% gender quota and zipper placement mandate) were women. In contrast, in the provinces 26 single-member plurality districts (where no quotas are in force), 0 of the 26 legislators elected were women.

The principal determinant of party magnitude is district magnitude (correlation of 0.59). Therefore a first, and fundamental, reform should be to eliminate all small magnitude districts (especially the single-member districts). Figure 5 demonstrates that as district magnitude advances beyond five, the percentage of seats won in the district by a party winning only one seat also drops. At the same time, extremely high party magnitude values (e.g., above ten) are inexistent until district magnitude passes 20. This reform should therefore promote the creation of district magnitude values that are above 5 and ideally below 20 (assuming the use of PR), although the former point is much more crucial than the latter.

Figure 5 about here

Secondary electoral law reforms that will work with district magnitude changes to increase average party magnitude values include electoral formula modifications and the adoption of thresholds. Given its tendency to favor larger parties (Lijphart 1994), where proportional representation is used for seat allocation, the d'Hondt formula should be utilized in place of the LR-Hare formula (although the reality in Latin America is that all

but a handful of countries already employ the d'Hondt formula). Other alternatives that will work to improve the size of party magnitude are the adoption of a requirement that a party surpass a district-level vote thresholds as in Argentina (especially in electoral districts with large district magnitudes) or national-level vote thresholds as in Peru. For instance, parties could be required to win at least 5% of the votes in a district to be eligible to receive seats in the district or to win 5% of the national-level vote to be eligible to receive any seats (regardless of district-level results).

In sum, in order to promote the equal representation of women, all countries should adopt an electoral system with the following features. 1). Quota legislation mandating that no more than 50% of the candidates (with the odd number of candidates exception) be of the same sex and that the sex of the candidates on the party lists alternate (i.e., zippered). 2). Lists that do not comply with the quota legislation requisites will be rejected. 3). Closed lists should be utilized for the election of legislators. 4). Legislators should be elected from medium sized multi-member districts (e.g., with 6 to 20 members). 5). The d'Hondt formula should be utilized for seat allocation where proportional representation is the indicated seat allocation methodology. 6). In large magnitude districts a 5% threshold should be utilized, and/or at the national level a 5% vote threshold should be utilized.

The adoption of these reforms would result in a substantial increase in the percentage of women elected throughout Latin America. The magnitude of this increase would vary by country and, within country's with a bicameral parliament by legislature, depending in large part on the current methods utilized. However, the overall percentage of women in most of the legislative bodies would most likely reach approximately 40%.

The case of Costa Rica is instructive in this point, as among the existing electoral system arrangements in Latin America, it is the one that most closely approximates the electoral system proposed here. It differs from the ideal system in that its quota percentage (40%) and placement mandate rules do not require men and women to alternate on the party lists (although the actual distribution does not deviate far from this ideal), it employs the LR-Hare formula (with a 1/2 quota threshold) which exercises a modest reductive impact on party magnitude (for instance had the d'Hondt formula been used in 2006, the average party magnitude would have been 2.48, and not 2.11 as was actually the case), and in several electoral districts the district magnitude is less than ideal levels (in three provinces district magnitude is five and in one province it is four).

In the 2006 Costa Rican elections, 22 (39%) of the 57 deputies elected were women. Table 7 provides a distribution of the seats won by electoral district and party. In the three larger electoral districts women won 17 of the 38 seats in play (45%). However in the four districts that elected five or fewer deputies, women only won 5 of the 19 seats being contested (26%). Had the district magnitude in these districts been higher, the percentage of women elected would have been notably higher.

Table 7 about here

3C. WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION: SUMMARY OF BENEFITS AND COSTS

The benefits of the above reform proposal are three-fold. First, and most importantly, the reform will immediately improve the descriptive representation of women in the region's legislative bodies. This improved presence of women in the legislature will in turn enhance the legitimacy of the country's democratic system of government. Second, by increasing the presence of women in positions of power, the

reform will aid in the creation of an autonomous and powerful cadre of women political leaders in the country. Third, the presence of an increased contingent of women in the legislature will allow for a greater degree of substantive representation of issues and policies of importance to women in Latin America, the interests of whom are often not adequately represented by overwhelmingly male legislative bodies.

The direct costs of these reforms are divided into two groups. The first are the political costs associated with the reforms, in particular the extent to which the above recommended reforms require changes in the existing electoral legislation and the degree to which the current rules are embedded in the political system (for instance have the current rules been in place for decades or only a few years). The other direct costs of this reform are those engendered by the positive action nature of the reform, which by definition "discriminates" against male candidates by limiting their ability to compete for public office. Given the extremely limited and constrained nature of these latter costs, they will not be considered in the cost/benefits analysis, however some information on them is provided in the following paragraph.

It should be noted that this reform provides for equal representation, and charges of "discrimination" are based on a vision that views the current dramatic under representation of women (itself the product of the considerable level of discrimination suffered by women in the region's political systems) as the status quo. There is also the concern that women who arrive to office under the quota system will hold a diminished status as legislators. However, there is no empirical evidence that this is in fact the case in any of Latin America's democracies. In fact an advantage of these types of formal quota systems (as contrasted with reserved seat systems) is that they dovetail nicely with

informal quotas that exist in the candidate selection process throughout the region's political systems (e.g., factional quotas, regional quotas, union quotas). In sum, the direct costs of this reform proposal are very minor.

This reform has three main components. The first is the employment effective gender quota legislation, the second is the utilization of closed lists, and the third is the manner in which the system promotes moderate levels of party magnitude (in particular the use of moderate sized electoral districts, the use of the d'Hondt formula, and the use of district or national level thresholds).

The benefits of these changes are measured in terms of the expected impact on the goal of achieving gender parity in the national legislature (in particular how the reform would move the country from its present status towards the goal of gender parity). The costs of these changes are measured in terms of the impact the reforms would have on aspects of Representativeness, Effectiveness, and Participation.

Three general solutions are presented and then applied to the legislatures of Latin America. The first solution (A) entails the employment of the ideal gender quota legislation as described above (e.g., 50% quota, zippered lists, full compliance), closed party lists, and electoral rules conducive to moderate sized party magnitude values (in particular limiting the number of single seats won by parties at the district level). The second solution (B) entails the employment of the ideal gender quota legislation (50% quota, zippered lists), but no other changes to the existing legislation. The third solution (C) entails employment of the ideal gender quota legislation (50% quota, zippered lists) and closed party lists, but no changes regarding magnitude.

Solution A would provide the greatest benefits in terms of the election of women legislators, virtually insuring a legislature whose composition would be between 40% and 50% female.

Solution B's benefits would vary depending on the existing party magnitude values and list format in the region's legislatures. This Solution's impact would be the greatest (resulting in an approximately 20% jump in the percentage of women elected) among the systems that presently do not have effective quota legislation but at the same time employ medium-sized to large electoral districts (and to a lesser extent the d'Hondt formula and/or district-level or national-level thresholds) as well as utilize closed party lists. It would also have a positive effect (albeit weaker than that in the systems mentioned immediately above) in systems that do not have effective quota legislation and at the same time employ open lists (approximately 15%). This Solution's impact would be the weakest among the systems that presently have effective quota legislation (in the closed list systems a 10% increase would be expected, while it is unclear what the expectations would be for the open list systems).

Solution C's benefits would be greatest (15% to 20%) in those systems that presently do not have effective quota legislation and employ medium-sized to large electoral districts (and to a lesser extent the d'Hondt formula and/or district-level or national-level thresholds). It would also have a noteworthy impact (approximately 10%) in open list systems that currently have effective quota legislation, as long as party magnitude values are not predominantly one in value. For instance, were the recent open list converts of the Dominican Republic (Chamber), Ecuador, and Honduras to shift back to closed lists, we would expect the percentage of women elected to office to increase by

approximately 7%, 6%, and 12% respectively (with the differences due to the higher party magnitude values existing in Honduras).

The most direct cost of the reforms above would be in the replacing of male legislators with female legislators. As there is no existing literature that demonstrates that male legislators are superior in their legislative capacities to female legislators, this cost is considered to be nonexistent.

A series of indirect costs (and perhaps benefits) would be associated with the extent to which the reforms related to increasing party magnitude (Solutions A and B) and changing the type of party list used (Solutions A and C) would affect the degree of Representativeness, Effectiveness, and Participation of the electoral system (Payne et al. 2007). Here I follow Payne et al. (2007) in assessing the impact of these reforms on these three crucial consequences of an electoral system for the functioning of politics.

The most substantial reform would be adopting medium-sized to large-sized districts for the election of national legislators. For systems that currently possess a large number of small-sized PR districts, this reform would increase the level of Representativeness, reduce the level of Effectiveness, and perhaps result in a modest increase in Participation. For systems that currently employ mixed-member PR, this reform would have no effect on Representativeness, and a minor negative effect on Effectiveness, and a negative effect on Participation. For the few single-member district systems, this reform would strongly increase Representativeness, strongly reduce Effectiveness, and Strongly reduce Participation. The more modest party magnitude related reforms (national or district thresholds, d'Hondt formula) would exercise a very

modest negative effective on Representativeness and a very modest positive effect on Effectiveness (and no impact on Participation).

The adoption of closed lists to replace open lists would have no impact on Representativeness. In contrast it would have a positive impact on Effectiveness and a negative impact on Participation.

Table 8 provides a summary of the Benefits and Costs (perhaps better thought of as the consequences of the Solutions for Representativeness, Effectiveness, and Participation in the political system) of the three Solutions. In general the reforms that would increase the percentage of women elected to national legislative office would improve Representativeness (due to the reforms designed to increase party magnitude), have a mixed to negative effect on Effectiveness (due to the reforms designed to increase party magnitude, but tempered in some instances by the move from open to closed lists), and a neutral and at times negative impact on Participation (where mixed member systems are eliminated and where open lists are replaced by closed lists). The benefits would be greatest in those systems that presently do not employ effective quota legislation and follow Solution A.

Table 8 about here

4. CONCLUSION

Latin America's democracies currently are facing a myriad of difficult challenges. In this paper I have identified two critical challenges facing the region's democracies, and proposed two solutions for the democracies that will aid them in addressing these challenges. It is important to remember that Latin America's democracies are incredibly diverse, and that given the dramatically different democratic contexts in these countries,

that any reforms proposed must take into account the specific situation in each country.

Reiterating a point made earlier, in the area of democracy, several Latin American democracies are models for the region and the world (e.g., Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay), while others are severely deficient across a wide range of democratic indicators (e.g., Guatemala, Haiti, Venezuela).

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TABLE 1: PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION INDEX

COUNTRY	INSTITUTIONALIZATION INDEX	ELECTORAL VOLATILITY	PARTY ROOTS	P&E LEGITIMACY	PARTY ORGANIZATION
URUGUAY	80	77	80	66	97
EL SALVADOR	75	89	71	43	98
HONDURAS	73	94	76	40	82
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	73	73	89	48	80
PANAMA	71	86	76	43	79
CHILE	71	97	55	54	78
ARGENTINA	69	81	56	47	91
PARAGUAY	68	72	89	36	73
NICARAGUA	67	69	76	36	86
MEXICO	65	76	66	37	82
COSTA RICA	64	74	71	51	61
BRAZIL	61	85	45	37	76
VENEZUELA	57	53	57	55	65
ECUADOR	52	57	59	28	64
COLOMBIA	51	64	56	38	46
PERU	50	43	58	34	67
GUATEMALA	44	41	51	36	49
BOLIVIA	43	26	68	29	51

TABLE 2: BENEFIT & COST INFORMATION FOR THE PROPOSED PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION SOLUTION

COUNTRY	SOLUTION BENEFIT	SOLUTION COST	BENEFIT/COST RATIO
ARGENTINA	5	2	2.50
BOLIVIA	2	3	0.67
BRAZIL	3	1	3.00
CHILE	1	1	1.00
COLOMBIA	5	1	5.00
COSTA RICA	3	1	3.00
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	6	4	1.50
ECUADOR	4	4	1.00
EL SALVADOR	2	2	1.00
GUATEMALA	3	3	1.00
HONDURAS	3	4	0.75
MEXICO	2	2	1.00
NICARAGUA	1	3	0.33
PANAMA	2	1	2.00
PARAGUAY	4	3	1.33
PERU	4	2	2.00
URUGUAY	5	1	5.00
VENEZUELA	6	5	1.20

The theoretical range for the benefits and costs is 0 (no benefit/no cost) to 8/6 (high benefit/high cost).

TABLE 3: LATIN AMERICAN LEGISLATURES: KEY ELECTORAL LAW FACTORS

COUNTRY	CHAMBER	QUOTA LAW (%)	FLAWED QUOTA LAW	PLACEMENT MANDATE	ELECTORAL SYSTEM	PARTY LIST
Argentina	Chamber	Yes (30%)	No	Yes	PR	Closed
Argentina	Senate	Yes (30%)	No	Yes	IL	Closed
Bolivia	Chamber-1	Yes (30%)	No	Yes	PR (MMPR)	Closed
Costa Rica	Unicameral	Yes (40%)	No	Yes	PR	Closed
Dom. Rep.	Chamber	Yes (33%)	No	No	PR	Open
Ecuador	Unicameral	Yes (45%)	No	No	PR	Open
Mexico	Chamber-1	Yes (30%)	No	Yes	PR (MMPR)	Closed
Mexico	Senate-1	Yes (30%)	No	Yes	PR	Closed
Honduras	Unicameral	Yes (30%)	No	No	PR	Open
Peru	Unicameral	Yes (30%)	No	No	PR	Open
Bolivia	Senate	Yes (30%)	Yes	No	IL	Closed
Brazil	Chamber	Yes (30%)	Yes	No	PR	Open
Mexico	Chamber-2	Yes (30%)	Yes	No	SMPD (MMPR)	Closed
Mexico	Senate-2	Yes (30%)	Yes	No	IL	Closed
Panama	Unicameral	Yes/Primary(30%)	Yes	No	PR/SMPD	Open
Paraguay	Chamber	Yes/Primary(20%)	Yes	Yes	PR	Closed
Paraguay	Senate	Yes/Primary(20%)	Yes	Yes	PR	Closed
Bolivia	Chamber-2	No	n.a.	No	SMPD (MMPR)	Closed
Brazil	Senate-1	No	n.a.	No	SMPD	Closed
Brazil	Senate-2	No	n.a.	No	MM-Plur	Open
Chile	Chamber	No	n.a.	No	PR	Open
Chile	Senate	No	n.a.	No	PR	Open
Colombia	Chamber	No	n.a.	No	PR	Open/Closed
Colombia	Senate	No	n.a.	No	PR	Open/Closed
El Salvador	Unicameral	No	n.a.	No	PR	Closed
Guatemala	Unicameral	No	n.a.	No	PR	Closed
Nicaragua	Unicameral	No	n.a.	No	PR	Closed
Puerto Rico	Chamber-1	No	n.a.	No	SMPD	Closed
Puerto Rico	Chamber-2	No	n.a.	No	MM-PL	Open
Puerto Rico	Senate-1	No	n.a.	No	SNTV	Open
Uruguay	Chamber	No	n.a.	No	PR (DSV)	Closed
Uruguay	Senate	No	n.a.	No	PR (DSV)	Closed
Venezuela	Unicameral-1	No	n.a.	No	PR/PL (MMPR)	Closed
Venezuela	Unicameral-2	No	n.a.	No	SMPD (MMPR)	Closed

DSV: Double Simultaneous Vote

IL: Incomplete List

MM-PL: Multi-Member District, Plurality Formula

MMPR: Mixed Member Proportional Representation

PR: Proportional Representation

PR/PL: PR Districts with a few Multi-Member Plurality districts.

PR/SMPD: Mixture of Multi-Member districts and single-member districts.

SMPD: Single-Member Plurality District

TABLE 4: DETERMINANTS OF THE ELECTION OF WOMEN: FULL POPULATION

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	MODEL 1 ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT	EXPECTED VALUE
CLOSED LIST-QUOTAS	Excluded Category	30.010 (28.247, 31.840)
OPEN LIST-QUOTAS	-7.922** (2.146)	22.090 (18.861, 25.118)
CLOSED LIST-FLAWED/NO QUOTAS	-20.433*** (1.358)	9.598 (7.701, 11.323)
OPEN LIST-FLAWED/NO QUOTAS	-17.487*** (1.663)	12.586 (10.307, 14.852)
DISTRICT GENDER EGALITARIANISM	3.800 (4.130)	
LEFT POLITICAL PARTY	6.572** (1.927)	21.198 (18.682, 23.885)
PARTY MAGNITUDE-1	Excluded Category	
PARTY MAGNITUDE-2	4.622 (4.724)	
PARTY MAGNITUDE-3	3.999 (3.228)	
PARTY MAGNITUDE-4	5.031 (3.619)	
PARTY MAGNITUDE-5	4.164 (3.178)	
PARTY MAGNITUDE-6 TO 10	4.257 (4.127)	
PARTY MAGNITUDE-11 TO 15	-0.308 (3.101)	
PARTY MAGNITUDE-16 TO 22	1.673 (3.605)	
CONSTANT	15.785 (12.303)	
NUMBER OF CASES	1435	
R-SQUARED	0.081	
STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE	28.643	

Significant at the .05*, .01**, or .001*** level for a two-tailed test.

NOTE 1: The excluded party Electoral System Category is "CLOSED LIST-QUOTAS". The excluded party magnitude variable is "PARTY MAGNITUDE-1". Standard errors are clustered on the country and provided below the estimated coefficient in parentheses.

NOTE 2: The EXPECTED VALUE column provides the value for the variable when it is set to "1" while the other variables were set to their mean, except where it would be logically impossible for the variable to take on its mean value (e.g., when PARTY MAGNITUDE-2 equals 1, all other PARTY MAGNITUDE variables must equal zero). The 95% confidence interval for the expected value is provided below the expected value in parentheses). Clarify (10,000 simulations) was employed to calculate the EXPECTED VALUES (King et al. 2000).

NOTE 3: The Expected Value (and 95% confidence interval) when LEFT PARTY is 0 is 14.686 (12.946, 16.263).

TABLE 5: DETERMINANTS OF THE ELECTION OF WOMEN: ANALYZING THE EFFECTS FOR DIFFERENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM/QUOTA LEGISLATION COMBINATIONS

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	Model 7 ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT	EXPECTED VALUE	Model 8 ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT	EXPECTED VALUE	Model 9 ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT	EXPECTED VALUE	Model 10 ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT	EXPECTED VALUE
PARTY MAGNITUDE-1	Excluded Cat.	14.886 (7.477, 21.973)	Excluded Cat.	20.509 (14.424, 27.207)	Excluded Cat.	8.442 (4.814, 11.789)	Excluded Cat.	13.761 (9.898, 17.850)
PARTY MAGNITUDE-2	32.381*** (3.888)	47.484 (44.306, 50.661)	-0.708 (5.017)	19.707 (12.457, 26.729)	0.509 (2.428)	8.878 (5.315, 12.136)	-2.642 (7.037)	11.132 (6.668, 15.527)
PARTY MAGNITUDE-3	20.927*** (4.767)	35.900 (30.019, 41.925)	6.940 (5.336)	27.547 (19.380, 35.427)	7.679 (4.134)	16.103 (8.272, 23.331)	-2.708 (3.067)	8.579 (3.300, 14.467)
PARTY MAGNITUDE-4	19.141** (6.179)	34.417 (24.910, 43.084)	4.949 (4.755)	25.265 (18.321, 31.689)	14.105* (6.030)	22.627 (11.095, 33.184)	-5.298 (3.504)	11.058 (5.562, 16.363)
PARTY MAGNITUDE-5	17.631* (8.026)	33.261 (19.555, 46.950)	6.726 (7.906)	27.251 (13.172, 41.789)	6.973 (6.353)	15.497 (3.478, 27.500)	-1.162 (4.134)	12.809 (5.888, 20.176)
PARTY MAGNITUDE-6 TO 22	13.093* (6.063)	28.428 (20.930, 36.690)	12.754 (8.124)	34.051 (18.760, 48.577)	7.442** (2.635)	15.683 (11.930, 19.507)	-4.786 (3.080)	9.098 (4.775, 13.103)
DISTRICT GENDER EGALITARIANISM	5.159 (12.028)		16.046 (13.386)		2.131 (4.619)		-2.642 (7.037)	
LEFT POLITICAL PARTY	10.273 (5.994)		3.992 (6.902)		7.089* (2.914)	14.973 (10.171, 20.022)	5.841 (3.278)	
CONSTANT	-1.323 (34.371)		-23.357 (34.398)		0.475 (12.902)			
NUMBER OF CASES	236		269		443		487	
R-SQUARED	0.253		.030		0.033		0.012	
STANDARD ERROR OF ESTIMATE	24.748		34.539		24.274		29.249	
ELECTORAL SYSTEM/QUOTA LEGISLATION	Closed/Quotas		Open/Quotas		Closed/F&N Quotas		Open/F&N Quotas	
Robust Standard Errors								

Significant at the .05*, .01**, or .001*** level for a two-tailed test.
Robust Standard Errors are below the estimated coefficient in parentheses.

NOTE 1: The EXPECTED VALUE column provides the value for the variable when it is set to "1" while the other variables were set to their mean, except where it would be logically impossible for the variable to take on its mean value (e.g., when PARTY MAGNITUDE-2 equals 1, all other PARTY MAGNITUDE variables must equal zero). The 95% confidence interval for the expected value is provided below the expected value in parentheses). Clarify (10,000 simulations) was employed to calculate the EXPECTED VALUES (King et al. 2000).

NOTE 2: The expected value (and 95% confidence interval) when Left Political Party is set to 0 is: Model 9 (7.661, 5.267, 10.118).

TABLE 6: DETERMINANTS OF THE ELECTION OF WOMEN: ANALYZING THE EFFECTS FOR DIFFERENT PARTY MAGNITUDE VALUES

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	MODEL 2 ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT	EXPECTED VALUE	MODEL 3 ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT	EXPECTED VALUE	MODEL 4 ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT	EXPECTED VALUE	MODEL 5 ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT	EXPECTED VALUE	MODEL 6 ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT*	EXPECTED VALUE
CLOSED LIST-QUOTAS	Excluded Cat.	15.322 (9.158, 21.402)	Excluded Cat.	47.989 (45.179, 51.040)	Excluded Cat.	36.399 (29.724, 42.838)	Excluded Cat.	33.407 (24.431, 42.449)	Excluded Cat.	31.697 (26.383, 36.822)
OPEN LIST-QUOTAS	5.895 (5.077)	21.460 (15.000, 28.103)	-29.921*** (2.525)	18.080 (14.893, 21.080)	-8.537 (4.067)	28.039 (24.449, 31.831)	-6.074 (5.596)	27.189 (23.163, 31.579)	1.994 (5.802)	33.628 (23.248, 43.606)
CLOSED LIST-FLAWED/NO QUOTAS	-7.067 (3.684)	8.304 (5.419, 11.193)	-39.289*** (2.667)	8.748 (4.842, 12.224)	-21.187*** (5.447)	15.535 (7.452, 24.709)	-12.116* (5.209)	21.289 (14.609, 27.720)	-16.162*** (4.172)	15.616 (10.161, 21.421)
OPEN LIST-FLAWED/NO QUOTAS	-1.562 (3.411)	13.710 (10.898, 16.652)	-37.004*** (2.142)	11.033 (7.583, 14.704)	-29.347*** (3.634)	7.223 (4.427, 9.994)	24.446*** (5.394)	8.996 (2.888, 15.028)	-21.421*** (3.974)	10.198 (5.437, 15.168)
DISTRICT GENDER EGALITARIANISM	4.975 (6.780)		-1.035 (4.056)		7.658 (5.951)		12.190 (6.509)		1.086 (4.904)	
LEFT POLITICAL PARTY	6.595* (3.102)	18.472 (13.604, 23.391)	8.079*** (2.130)	25.778 (22.717, 29.252)	11.906* (4.466)	28.9856 (22.811, 35.670)	12.236* (5.037)	30.815 (21.087, 40.488)	-0.588 (3.631)	
CONSTANT	-0.332 (19.553)		49.060*** (12.188)		12.198 (17.306)		-3.081 (20.921)		28.496 (17.152)	
NUMBER OF CASES	809		333		118		58		117	
R-SQUARED	0.027		0.367		0.300		0.375		0.4071	
SEE	33.803		20.113		18.681		14.406		12.674	
PARTY MAGNITUDE VALUE	1		2		3		4		5 to 22	

Significant at the .05*, .01**, or .001*** level for a two-tailed test.
Robust Standard Errors (clustered on countries) are below the estimated coefficient in parentheses.

NOTE 1: For the PM5TO22 analysis, Party Magnitude-6to10, Party Magnitude11to15, and Party Magnitude16to22 are included in the analysis but not shown in the table for reasons of space. None of the variables were significant at the .05 level or higher.

NOTE 2: The EXPECTED VALUE column provides the value for the variable when it is set to "1" while the other variables were set to their mean, except where it would be logically impossible for the variable to take on its mean value (e.g., when PARTY MAGNITUDE-2 equals 1, all other PARTY MAGNITUDE variables must equal zero). The 95% confidence interval for the expected value is provided below the expected value in parentheses). Clarify (10,000 simulations) was employed to calculate the EXPECTED VALUES (King et al. 2000).

NOTE 3: The expected value (and 95% confidence interval) when Left Political Party is set to 0 is: Model 3 (11.772, 9.392, 14.501); Model 4 (17.843, 15.716, 19.961), Model 5 (17.031, 13.873, 20.406), Model 6 (18.396, 15.544, 20.868).

TABLE 7: THE 2006 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS IN COSTA RICA**POLITICAL PARTIES (WOMEN ELECTED/SEATS WON)**

PROVINCE	DISTRICT MAGNITUDE	TOTAL WOMEN	PLN	PAC	ML	PUSC	OTHERS (4 total)
SAN JOSE	20	8	3/7	3/5	1/2	1/2	0/1, 0/1, 0/1, 0/1
ALAJUELA	11	5	2/5	2/4	0/1	1/1	
CARTAGO	7	4	2/3	2/3	0/1		
HEREDIA	5	2	1/3	1/2			
LIMON	5	1	1/2	0/1	0/1	0/1	
PUNTARENAS	5	1	1/2	0/1	0/1	0/1	
GUANACASTE	4	1	1/3	0/1			
TOTAL	57	22	11/25	8/17	1/6	2/5	0/4

TABLE 8: COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE THREE QUOTA SOLUTIONS BY SYSTEM TYPE

CURRENT SYSTEM	SOLUTION A				SOLUTION B				SOLUTION C			
	Increase in % of Women	Impact on on REP	Impact on EFFECT	Impact on PART	Increase in % of Women	Impact on on REP	Impact on EFFECT	Impact on PART	Increase in % of Women	Impact on on REP	Impact on EFFECT	Impact on PART
Quotas + Closed Lists + Ideal PM	Low	=	=	=	Low	=	=	=	Low	=	=	=
Quotas + Closed Lists + Low PM	Moderate	+/=	-/=	=/-	Moderate	+/=	-/=	=/-	Low	=/=	=/=	=/=
Quotas + Open Lists + Ideal PM	Moderate	=	+	-	Low	=	=	=	Moderate	=	+	-
Quotas + Open Lists + Low PM	Moderate	+	=	-	Low	+	-	=	Low	=	+	-
No/Flawed Quotas + Closed Lists + Ideal PM	High	=	=	=	High	=	=	=	High	=	=	=
No/Flawed Quotas + Closed Lists + Low PM	High	+/=	-/=	=/-	High	+/=	-/=	=/-	Moderate	=/=	=/=	=/=
No/Flawed Quotas + Open Lists + Ideal PM	High	=	+	-	Low	=	=	=	High	=	+	-
No/Flawed Quotas + Open Lists + Low PM	High	+	=	-	Low	+	-	=	Moderate	=	+	-

Increase in the % of Women
 Very High (35% +)
 High (25%-34%)
 Moderate (15%-24%)
 Low (5%-14%)
 Very Low (less than 5%)

+ (positive), '- (negative), = (neutral).

In the "Low PM"/Closed List Category the first entry is for the PR systems and the second is for the mixed systems.

FIGURE 1: FREEDOM (DEMOCRACY) IN THE AMERICAS: 2007




FIGURE 2: CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN THE AMERICAS: 2007





FIGURE 3: THE REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN LATIN AMERICA



**FIGURE 4: WHERE LEGISLATORS COME FROM IN LATIN AMERICA:
WITH AND WITHOUT SINGLE MEMBER DISTRICTS**




FIGURE 5: THE PERCENTAGE OF SEATS WON BY PARTIES WINNING ONLY ONE SEAT BY DISTRICT MAGNITUDE

