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Thomas C. Schelling
Distinguished University Professor, University of Maryland |
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Distinguished University Professor and Professor of Economics, Emeritus, of Harvard University, born 1920. He spent the years 1948-1953 in Europe and Washington with the Marshall Plan and related programs, joined Yale University in 1953, Harvard University in 1958 and came to Maryland in 1990. Holds an AB in Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 1944 and a PhD Economics, Harvard University, 1951. Schelling came to the Maryland School of Public Affairs after twenty years at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, where he was the Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy. He has been elected to the National Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Medicine, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. In 1991 he was President of the American Economic Association, of which he is a Distinguished Fellow. (University of Maryland)
He was the recipient of the Frank E. Seidman Distinguished Award in Political Economy and the National Academy of Sciences award for Behavioral Research Relevant to the Prevention of Nuclear War. He served in the Economic Cooperation Administration in Europe, and has held positions in the White House and Executive Office of the President, Yale University, the RAND Corporation and the Department of Economics and Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. |
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Schelling has published on military strategy and arms control, energy and environmental policy, climate change, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, organized crime, foreign aid and international trade, conflict and bargaining theory, racial segregation and integration, the military draft, health policy, tobacco and drugs policy, and ethical issues in public policy and in business. |
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Link to homepage |
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Selected publications |
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The Strategy of Conflict, 1960.
"Experimental Games and Bargaining Theory", 1960, World Politics.
Arms and Influence, 1976.
Micromotives and Macrobehavior, 1978.
Thinking Through the Energy Problem, 1979.
Incentives for Environmental Protection, 1983.
Choice and Consequence, 1985.
Strategy and Arms Control, 1986
Bargaining, Communication and Limited War, 1993. |
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